PUBLICATIONS
The Crowding-out Effect of Formal Insurance on Informal Risk Sharing: An Experimental Study, Games and Economic Behavior, 2014. (joint with Wanchuan Lin and Juanjuan Meng) (SSRN)
Face Masks Increase Compliance with Physical Distancing Recommendations During the COVID-19 Pandemic, Journal of the Economic Science Association, Accepted (joint with Gyula Seres, Anna Helen Balleyer, Nicola Cerutti, Anastasia Danilov, Jana Friedrichsen , Müge Süer) (link)
Confusing Context with Character: Correspondence Bias in Economic Interactions, Management Science, Accepted (joint with Yi Han and George Loewenstein) (pdf)
WORKING PAPERS
In economic theory, present biased preference, a dynamic inconsistent preference, implies that people want to deviate from their own plans that benefit them in the long-run. This paper develops a theory of optimally setting goals to counteract this bias and tests the predictions of the model in an online real-effort experiment. In our multi-selves model, the long-run self sets goals as reference points to motivate the short-run selves. Narrow bracketing is defined as setting one goal for each short-run self and broad goal-setting is defined as setting one broad goal for several short-run selves to jointly achieve. In line with the predictions of the model, the results of our online experiment show that 1) “Nudging” subjects to set narrow goals facilitates self-control. 2) The assumption that goals work as reference points is supported by empirical evidence. 3) Subjects who are more present-biased benefit more from goal-setting. 4) Broad goal-setting does not work. It also causes procrastination: subjects exert more efforts on the later date under it. 5) Surprisingly, but consistent with the model, we find that narrow goal-setting always outperforms broad goal-setting from the long-run self’s perspective regardless of the degree of present bias. However, the gap between the two bracketing methods shrinks as present bias decreases.
Responsibility Shifting through Delegation: Evidence from China's One Child Policy (joint with Yi Han) (pdf)
There is a growing body of experimental evidence indicating that delegation can foster the shifting of responsibility for unpopular actions from a principal to an agent. Using the well-known episode of the one-child policy in China, we provide first field evidence for responsibility shifting through delegation.
RESEARCH IN PROGRESS
Merit in a Society of Unequal Opportunities (joint with Alexander W. Cappelen, Hedda Nielsen, and Bertil Tungodden)
Performance Self-assessment and Matching Outcomes in a High-stakes Environment: Evidence from Chinese Entrance Exams (joint with Stephanie Wang)
INSTRUCTOR
Intro to Microeconomics, summer 2016, 2017
Overall Teaching Effective Score: 4.4/5 (2016) 4.4/5 (2017)
Overall Teaching Effective Score: 4.4/5 (2016) 4.4/5 (2017)
TEACHING ASSISTANT
Game Theory, Spring 2016 (Graduate)
Intermediate Microeconomics, Spring 2015 (Undergraduate)
Intro to Macroeconomics, Spring 2014 (Undergraduate)
Intro to Microeconomics, Fall 2013 (Undergraduate)
Intermediate Microeconomics, Spring 2015 (Undergraduate)
Intro to Macroeconomics, Spring 2014 (Undergraduate)
Intro to Microeconomics, Fall 2013 (Undergraduate)