Yiming Liu
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Yiming Liu

Postdoctoral Research Fellow 
Humboldt University of Berlin/WZB Berlin Social Science Center

​Research Interest: Behavioral Economics, Applied Theory, Experimental Economics
Email: yiming.liu@hu-berlin.de
CV

PUBLICATIONS

The Crowding-out Effect of Formal Insurance on Informal Risk Sharing: An Experimental Study, Games and Economic Behavior, 2014. (joint with Wanchuan Lin and Juanjuan Meng) (SSRN)
Face Masks Increase Compliance with Physical Distancing Recommendations During the COVID-19 Pandemic, Journal of the Economic Science Association, Accepted (joint with Gyula Seres, Anna Helen Balleyer, Nicola Cerutti, Anastasia Danilov, Jana Friedrichsen , Müge Süer) (link) 
Confusing Context with Character: Correspondence Bias in Economic Interactions, Management Science, Accepted (joint with Yi Han and George Loewenstein) (pdf) 

WORKING PAPERS

Effort Provision under Present Bias: Optimal Goal-Setting as a Commitment Device (pdf)
In economic theory, present biased preference, a dynamic inconsistent preference, implies that people want to deviate from their own plans that benefit them in the long-run. This paper develops a theory of optimally setting goals to counteract this bias and tests the predictions of the model in an online real-effort experiment. In our multi-selves model, the long-run self sets goals as reference points to motivate the short-run selves. Narrow bracketing is defined as setting one goal for each short-run self and broad goal-setting is defined as setting one broad goal for several short-run selves to jointly achieve. In line with the predictions of the model, the results of our online experiment show that 1) “Nudging” subjects to set narrow goals facilitates self-control. 2) The assumption that goals work as reference points is supported by empirical evidence. 3) Subjects who are more present-biased benefit more from goal-setting. 4) Broad goal-setting does not work. It also causes procrastination: subjects exert more efforts on the later date under it. 5) Surprisingly, but consistent with the model, we find that narrow goal-setting always outperforms broad goal-setting from the long-run self’s perspective regardless of the degree of present bias. However, the gap between the two bracketing methods shrinks as present bias decreases.​
​Responsibility Shifting through Delegation: Evidence from China's One Child Policy (joint with Yi Han) (pdf)
There is a growing body of experimental evidence indicating that delegation can foster the shifting of responsibility for unpopular actions from a principal to an agent. Using the well-known episode of the one-child policy in China, we provide first field evidence for responsibility shifting through delegation. 

RESEARCH IN PROGRESS

Merit in a Society of Unequal Opportunities (joint with Alexander W. Cappelen, Hedda Nielsen, and Bertil Tungodden)
Performance Self-assessment and Matching Outcomes in a High-stakes Environment: Evidence from Chinese Entrance Exams (joint with Stephanie Wang)
​INSTRUCTOR
Intro to Microeconomics, summer 2016, 2017
Overall Teaching Effective Score: 4.4/5 (2016) 4.4/5 (2017)
TEACHING ASSISTANT
Game Theory, Spring 2016 (Graduate)
Intermediate Microeconomics, Spring 2015 (Undergraduate)
Intro to Macroeconomics, Spring 2014 (Undergraduate)
Intro to Microeconomics, Fall 2013 (Undergraduate)

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