PUBLICATIONS
The Crowding-out Effect of Formal Insurance on Informal Risk Sharing: An Experimental Study, Games and Economic Behavior, 2014. (joint with Wanchuan Lin and Juanjuan Meng) (SSRN)
WORKING PAPERS
In economic theory, present biased preference, a dynamic inconsistent preference, implies that people want to deviate from their own plans that benefit them in the long-run. This paper develops a theory of optimally setting goals to counteract this bias and tests the predictions of the model in an online real-effort experiment. In our multi-selves model, the long-run self sets goals as reference points to motivate the short-run selves. Narrow bracketing is defined as setting one goal for each short-run self and broad goal-setting is defined as setting one broad goal for several short-run selves to jointly achieve. In line with the predictions of the model, the results of our online experiment show that 1) “Nudging” subjects to set narrow goals facilitates self-control. 2) The assumption that goals work as reference points is supported by empirical evidence. 3) Subjects who are more present-biased benefit more from goal-setting. 4) Broad goal-setting does not work. It also causes procrastination: subjects exert more efforts on the later date under it. 5) Surprisingly, but consistent with the model, we find that narrow goal-setting always outperforms broad goal-setting from the long-run self’s perspective regardless of the degree of present bias. However, the gap between the two bracketing methods shrinks as present bias decreases.
Responsibility Shifting through Delegation: Evidence from China's One Child Policy (joint with Yi Han) (pdf)
There is a growing body of experimental evidence indicating that delegation can foster the shifting of responsibility for unpopular actions from a principal to an agent. Using the well-known episode of the one-child policy in China, we provide first field evidence for responsibility shifting through delegation.
Correspondence Bias (joint with Yi Han and George Loewenstein) (pdf) New
When drawing inferences about a person’s enduring characteristics from her actions, correspondence bias is the tendency to overestimate the influence of the person’s enduring characteristics and underestimate the influence of transient situational factors. Focusing on incentives as one important situational factor, we build a simple model to formalize correspondence bias, and test predictions of the model in an online experiment. All players first play the dictator game, as the dictator, with an unknown receiver. Next, depending on their experimental condition, players are assigned to play a ‘benign’ game that encourages cooperation with another player, a ‘malign’ game that encourages selfish behavior, or both games with different players. Everyone then chooses to receive the dictator givings from one of two players who they may have played the benign or malign game with. Consistent with correspondence bias, subjects are on average willing to pay to receive the dictator givings from a player with whom they played the benign game. We show, further, that experiencing both games oneself, as opposed to playing one and observing the other, reduces the bias, and receiving information about how each of the players behaved in both
games, eliminates it.
games, eliminates it.
Face Masks Increase Compliance with Physical Distancing Recommendations During the COVID-19 Pandemic (joint with Gyula Seres, Anna Helen Balleyer, Nicola Cerutti, Anastasia Danilov, Jana Friedrichsen , Müge Süer) (link) New
Governments across the world have implemented restrictive policies to slow the spread of COVID-19. Mandatory face mask use has been a controversially discussed policy, among others, due to potential adverse effects on physical distancing. Using a randomized field experiment (N=300), we show that individuals keep a significantly larger distance from someone wearing a face mask than from an unmasked person. According to an additional survey experiment (N=456), masked individuals are not perceived as being more infectious than unmasked ones, but they are believed to prefer more distancing. This result suggests that, in times where mask use is voluntary, wearing a mask serves as a social signal for a preferred greater distance that is respected by others. Our findings provide strong evidence against a potential negative effect of masking on physical distancing, suggesting that mandatory masking would indeed be effective. However, as the social signal from masks may become diluted under a universal masking policy, the observed positive effect of masks on distancing may weaken under mandatory masking.
RESEARCH IN PROGRESS
Income Inequality and Political Polarization
In last four decades, party polarization and income inequality have experienced rising comovement. In this paper, I build a link between the two. I consider a Spatial model of redistribution with heterogeneity in voters' wealth. Two ex ante identical candidates compete for a public office by proposing redistributive taxes. Voters care about taxes and candidates' valence. Valence is endogenously determined by campaign spending financed by voter's individual contributions. Rich voters have the strongest incentive to contribute, because they are mostly affected by taxes. In equilibrium, policy polarization arises when income inequality level is high enough. In this case, median voter's ideal tax is defeated by a lower tax that can attract enough campaign contributions from the rich. In contrast, when inequality level is low, median voter theorem holds. With low inequality, the ideal tax rates of the rich and the rich are not that different. The candidate who deviates from the median voter's ideal tax cannot collect enough funding from the rich because their incentives to change the election result are too weak.
Performance Self-assessment and Matching Outcomes in a High-stakes Environment: Evidence from Chinese Entrance Exams (joint with Stephanie Wang)
Track Choice in the Chinese Education System: a Machine Learning Approach (joint with Stephanie Wang)
INSTRUCTOR
Intro to Microeconomics, summer 2016, 2017
Overall Teaching Effective Score: 4.4/5 (2016) 4.4/5 (2017)
Overall Teaching Effective Score: 4.4/5 (2016) 4.4/5 (2017)
TEACHING ASSISTANT
Game Theory, Spring 2016 (Graduate)
Intermediate Microeconomics, Spring 2015 (Undergraduate)
Intro to Macroeconomics, Spring 2014 (Undergraduate)
Intro to Microeconomics, Fall 2013 (Undergraduate)
Intermediate Microeconomics, Spring 2015 (Undergraduate)
Intro to Macroeconomics, Spring 2014 (Undergraduate)
Intro to Microeconomics, Fall 2013 (Undergraduate)